

Introduction



- Good fiscal surveillance is necessary for a monetary union
- However, while necessary, it is not sufficient

This presentation:

- Big picture
- Focus on failures of the set-up in the euro area
- Highlight that financial fragility is a major concern
- Highlight that monetary policy is strongly linked with fiscal policy
- Highlight challenges on the way forward for the euro area

Next presentations


- Focus on SGP and national fiscal frameworks
- Focus on fiscal reporting underpinning the surveillance framework

Introduction



- Euro break-up is now openly discussed
- Maastricht set-up
 - SGP
 - Inflation targeting ECB
 - No bail-out clause
- Crisis has revealed the shortcomings of this approach
 - Insufficient surveillance and control of fiscal behavior (next presentations)
 - Private sector imbalances were largely ignored
 - Absence of crisis management and resolution mechanism
 - Insufficient banking supervision and resolution mechanism
- Self fulfilling crisis
 - Higher interest rate renders insolvency more likely
- Combination of banking fragility and self-fulfilling sovereign crisis is a deadly combination


Real economic divergence



Current account in % of GDP


The growth and adjustment agenda: price adjustment weak...






















ECB use of Deposit Facility as of 16th February 2012 - all-time high



Target 2 balances diverge --€bn



Monetary and fiscal policy



- In response to confidence crisis following real economic divergence and weak policy response, monetary policy stepped into the void and prevented a financial catastrophy.
- This has led to very high risk exposure within the eurosystem, i.e. between national central banks
- Losses/gains for national central banks mean losses/gains for national treasuries.
- Risk in monetary policy thus translates into fiscal risk
- Burden sharing arrangements are key

Current crisis response insufficient



- Six-pack
 - Right extension of supervision to non-fiscal part
 - National fiscal rules directive important
 - No true veto rights to effectively prevent moral hazard
- EFSF/ESM
 - Difficulty to access finance
 - Trajectory of instability as it depends on AAA rating countries
 - Overall size to small to credibly quell speculation
- EBA
 - Not a true European supervisor
 - Dexia test
- No credible way to break the vicious circle between banking and sovereign instability
- Fundamental reason: lack of fiscal capacity at EA level

The Greek deal



- Chaotic default and/or exit scenario has been prevented
- Once deal is finalized, Greece should stop being a source of financial instability
- Debt sustainability still not given in the case of minor shocks
- I expect that further debt write-downs will become necessary, this will involve the official sector (OSI)

What is needed?



- A growth and adjustment agenda
- A framework for dealing sustainably with banking fragility
- A stronger framework to provide assistance to countries if needed in combination with possibility to intervene in policy making
- → A strong euro area finance ministry with democratic legitimacy

What kind of fiscal union?



- Functions to be exercised at federal level
 - Insolvency vs illiquidity
 - Lender of last resort function: ECB vs Finance ministry
 - · What kind of assistance: flow vs stocks
 - Budget veto right
 - EDIC
 - EU vs EA
- Financing
- Legitimacy
- Transition

Conclusions



- Not all problems are fiscal
- Real economic divergence driven by the private actors in economy equally worrisome
- Banking sector instability and financial fragility highly dangerous
- Monetary policy is a part of fiscal policy and has strong fiscal implications.
- Best way to address these issues is with a strong federal fiscal institution
- Ideally, create political/fiscal union alongside monetary union